After the acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan, which envisaged the partition of Punjab and Bengal, a Boundary Commission was set up to delineate the boundaries. Cyril Radcliffe, an eminent British lawyer, who had never been involved in Indian politics nor ever visited India, was chosen as its Chairman. However, controversies arose when it was discovered that some of his decisions were influenced by Mountbatten who was bent upon appeasing the Congress.
According to one observer, 'the only moment of fury' in Mountbatten's entire tenure of Viceroyalty occurred when the Quaid-e-Azam turned down
Mountbatten's proposal as the common Governor General of the twc independent domin ions. The Viceroy, with royal blood flowing in his veins retorted and addressed the Quaid, "it may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan." And so it did. Mountbatten made Pakistan suffer in every possible way, from the division of the Armed Forces to the receipt of its share in the cash balance of the Government of India. With his pride wounded and his policy of appeasing Nehru and the Congress intact, Mountbatten took a stand in Hyderabad, which contradicted the policy he followed in Kashmir. The Hyderahad issue was settled with India taking a military action. However the Kashmir issue still lingers on and the two countries have gone to war on this account three times in 63 years. The Kashmir issue and Mounthatten's obvious intervention in the Radcliffe Award have been discussed in considerable length.
In the last chapter, the author has drawn some conclusions that seem to he largely true. Assessing the role of Mountbatten, it has been said that though he was sent to India as an 'impartial arbiter' he disowned that role by leaning heavily towards Nehru whom the author considers to be the 'most authoritative, influential and vocal Hindu leader.' Consequently, Mountbatten failed to strike a balance in his dealings with other leaders, particularly with the Quaid. The author speculates that if Mountbatten had sought advice from other leaders instead of singularly listening to Nehru, a Bangladesh comprising of a united Bengal could have emerged in 1947. While other leaders supported the idea, Nehru aborted it with his rejection of any sovereign entity outside the Indian Union. The responsibility for the carnage in the Punjab that accompanied Independence rested,
according to the author, squarely on the policy of asking the British Armed Forces stationed in India, not to involve themselves in matters of 'internal peace and security.' The author further maintains that the apathy these orders reflect, failed to create an 'imperial image' that Mounthatten had so desired.
The hook describes and discusses the various aspects of the Partition scheme and its implementation. However, the major issue that emerges out of its deliberations is the policy of appeasement followed religiously by Mountbatten in relation to Nehru. That policy resulted in not only undesirable consequences during Independence but also some, like the Kashmir issue, continue to linger and threaten
peace in the region.