BY OMER TASPINAR
The flotilla incident and Turkey\\\'s \\\'\\\'no\\\'\\\' vote to new sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council once again triggered a familiar debate about Turkey\\\'s alleged \\\'Islamic\\\' turn in foreign policy.
I\\\'ve made my opinion on this issue quite clear a number of times. I believe one of the major mistakes analysts make in analyzing Turkish foreign policy is speaking of a \\\'secular\\\' versus \\\'Islamic\\\' divide in Ankara\\\'s strategic choices. While the growing importance of religion in Turkey should not be dismissed, the real threat to Turkey\\\'s Western orientation today is not so much Islamization but growing nationalism and frustration with the US, Europe and Israel.
Long before the recent turn of events, I argued that if current trends continue, what we will see emerging in Turkey is not an Islamist foreign policy but a much more nationalist, defiant, independent, self-confident and self-centered strategic orientation in Ankara. Because of similarities between the French and Turkish political tradition, I think it helps to think of this new Turkish sense of self-confidence, nationalism, grandeur and frustration with traditional partners such as America, Europe and Israel as \\\'Turkish Gaullism.\\\' One should not underestimate the emergence of such a new Turkey that transcends the Islamic-secular divide because both the Kemalist neo-nationalist (ulusalcý) foreign policy and the Justice and Development Party\\\'s (AK Party) neo-Ottomanism -- the ideal of regional influence -- share the traits of Turkish Gaullism.
If we scratch the surface of what seems to be a secular versus Islamist divide in Turkish attitudes toward the West, we quickly see that both the so-called Islamist and secular camps embrace the same narrative vis-a-vis Europe and America: nationalist frustration. New obstacles to European Union accession, perceived injustice on Cyprus, growing global recognition of the Armenian \\\'genocide,\\\' and Western sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations are all major factors forcing Turks to question the value of their long-standing pro-Western geostrategic commitments. Until a couple of years ago, I used to argue that Western-oriented Kemalist elites had traded places with the once eastward-leaning Islamists on the grounds that it was the AK Party that seemed more interested in maintaining close ties with Europe and the US. The AK Party, in my eyes, needed the West more than Turkey\\\'s Kemalist establishment for a simple reason: It needed to prove to the Turkish military, secularist Turks, and Western partners in the international community that it was not an Islamist party.
(Courtesy TODAY\\\'S ZAMAN)
The flotilla incident and Turkey\\\'s \\\'\\\'no\\\'\\\' vote to new sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council once again triggered a familiar debate about Turkey\\\'s alleged \\\'Islamic\\\' turn in foreign policy.
I\\\'ve made my opinion on this issue quite clear a number of times. I believe one of the major mistakes analysts make in analyzing Turkish foreign policy is speaking of a \\\'secular\\\' versus \\\'Islamic\\\' divide in Ankara\\\'s strategic choices. While the growing importance of religion in Turkey should not be dismissed, the real threat to Turkey\\\'s Western orientation today is not so much Islamization but growing nationalism and frustration with the US, Europe and Israel.
Long before the recent turn of events, I argued that if current trends continue, what we will see emerging in Turkey is not an Islamist foreign policy but a much more nationalist, defiant, independent, self-confident and self-centered strategic orientation in Ankara. Because of similarities between the French and Turkish political tradition, I think it helps to think of this new Turkish sense of self-confidence, nationalism, grandeur and frustration with traditional partners such as America, Europe and Israel as \\\'Turkish Gaullism.\\\' One should not underestimate the emergence of such a new Turkey that transcends the Islamic-secular divide because both the Kemalist neo-nationalist (ulusalcý) foreign policy and the Justice and Development Party\\\'s (AK Party) neo-Ottomanism -- the ideal of regional influence -- share the traits of Turkish Gaullism.
If we scratch the surface of what seems to be a secular versus Islamist divide in Turkish attitudes toward the West, we quickly see that both the so-called Islamist and secular camps embrace the same narrative vis-a-vis Europe and America: nationalist frustration. New obstacles to European Union accession, perceived injustice on Cyprus, growing global recognition of the Armenian \\\'genocide,\\\' and Western sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations are all major factors forcing Turks to question the value of their long-standing pro-Western geostrategic commitments. Until a couple of years ago, I used to argue that Western-oriented Kemalist elites had traded places with the once eastward-leaning Islamists on the grounds that it was the AK Party that seemed more interested in maintaining close ties with Europe and the US. The AK Party, in my eyes, needed the West more than Turkey\\\'s Kemalist establishment for a simple reason: It needed to prove to the Turkish military, secularist Turks, and Western partners in the international community that it was not an Islamist party.
(Courtesy TODAY\\\'S ZAMAN)
