Admittedly, Pakistan’s governing institutions were weak from the outset, but the army’s meddling has made them even weaker. Under Mr Musharraf it has left the civil service and judiciary corrupt and demoralised. (A tenth of civil-service appointments must still go to officers.) The armed forces have a $20 billion business empire and are probably the country’s biggest land developer, as officers’ loyalty is bought with grants of land.
The leaders of the main parties are mainly to blame for their corrupt, feudal styles and for not practising the democracy they espouse even in their own parties. Yet the army also shares some of the blame for political backwardness. It has permitted only a handful of elections. Democracy might have been much more mature by now had elections been allowed to run their course.
The costs go beyond any democratic deficit. Pakistan’s economic and social development have also been stunted, as the army has sucked up resources and thwarted growth. In economic terms, educated Pakistanis think their country should be a Turkey or a Malaysia by now. Instead, it lies below Yemen in the UNDP’s ranking of human-development indicators, at 151st in the world. School enrolment ranks below Sudan. The government spends twice as much on the armed forces as on education.
Dogs with the keys to their kennel
Some say Pakistan has turned a corner. The army went back to barracks in 2008, pushed partly by the return and assassination of the populist leader, Benazir Bhutto. This year political parties reached consensus on constitutional changes that shift power towards parliament and away from the president, currently Asif Zardari, Miss Bhutto’s widower and heir to her political dynasty.
Optimists say this sets Pakistan on a path to more effective and accountable government. Perhaps. But the pessimist in Banyan counters that the army retains its huge say on national security. What’s more, civilian politics remains frequently corrupt, and personality trumps policy. What looks like a system of checks and balances today could look like gridlock tomorrow. The sort of combination, in other words, that tempts the army to poke its head out of the barracks again. (End)
Note: This Article is Published in the American Weekly. They have Trier own point of view about Pakistan and it\\\'s Army (Editor Editorial)
(Courtesy:The Economist)